Is consociational democracy democratic? Essay

Today, republic is both a pervasive presence and a valued symbol in European administration1. Theorists of the apprehension generally change course on the fundamental principles of democracy but swallow head for the hillsed to differ radically in their conception of customary regularise and popular radiation patterns2. Consequently, it was several(prenominal)what inevitable that democracy as an ideal emerged in different forms crosswise the diverse societies prevalent in Western Europe. Arend Lipjpharts seminal work on consociational democracies3 contributed to pop theory concerned primarily with political perceptual constancy of democratic regimes in plural societies4.The democratic viability of Lipjpharts theory has re centimely been called into question however5. What then is democracy? Establishing the benchmarks of the concept at the outset testament rear us to evaluate the goal to which consociational democracy fanny be seen as democratic. An assessment of the severalise themes of Lipjpharts theory that of marvelous coalitions, segmental familiarity, relativeity and nonage ostracise keepively will set the structure to the following discussion. Drawing examples from the Belgian and Swiss consociational regimes will provide illustrations of the emerging stemma that consociational democracy is undemocratic6.Abraham Lincoln famously described the concept of democracy as placement of the passel, by the people, for the people7. Lincolns prominent phrase encapsulates three fundamental principles, which, roughly translated, mean that we as citizens govern by dint of political component parties representing our interests exercise our choice through franchise to elect those in swear and confound the right to hold persons in king accountable for their actions. Moreover, the quartetteth striking characteristic noted by academics is that democracy represents political stability8.For Lipjphart, consociational democracy means government by elite cartel designed to warp a democracy with a fragmented political culture into a stable democracy9. proud coalitions would be used to prevent cultural diversity from being transformed into explosive cultural sectionalisation10. Politics, by its very nature, feeds on conflicts arising from social heterogeneity11 and the stability of split societies often depends on whether the elites of rival subcultures be willing and able to reject confrontation in favour of compromise12.A grand coalition enables political leaders of all the segments of the plural society to jointly govern the country13. Nobel prize winning economist Sir Arthur Lewis endorses the dodge by arguing that all who ar affected by a decision should have the happening to participate in making that decision, because to exclude losing groups from participation clearly violates the primary meaning of democracy14. In this sense, by embracing the notion of grand coalition, consociationalism can be say to be demo cratic15. on that point is, however, enjoin to suggest that in practice the principle of grand coalition does not adhere close to the benchmarks of democracy. The Belgian governmental arna has overall remained fairly closed to non-pillar parties, which seems to contradict the very eye of grand coalition government16. In Switzerland, even though the major parties are represented on roughly proportional grounds in the Federal Council, the representatives are not always those nominated by the political party17. Does this lie advantageously with the initial conception of democracy as government of the people? What of accountability? Since the Federal Council makes its decisions in a collegiate manner, no party can hold its representative government directly responsible18.The Swiss consociational ashes cannot therefore be said to be rightfully accountable to the electorate contrary to one of the fundamental principles of democracy19. Moreover, the Swiss referendum corpse has oft en highlighted flaws inherent in a grand coalition. Although the outcome of a insurance decision is one of amicable agreement among the elite, it might be opposed by 49% of the electorate at referendum20.Papadopoulos argues that the major problem stems from the fact that, since few decisions are taken at the end of the process by popular vote, it effectively excludes any further appeal or bargaining21. Can the grand coalition agreement truly coincide with the democratic principle of representativeness if binding collective decisions whitethorn be taken on very small popular majorities?22 Further more, since accommodating strategies are not always effective, they are more easily gridlocked23 and potentially unstable24. Consequently, it seems that elite appointment does not fulfil its proposed stabilising function and hence does not conform to the ultimate proposition of democratic stability.In all democracies power is necessarily divided to some extents mingled with the central and non-central governments in order to avoid a concentration of power25. The consociational school, insteepled by the literary works of Tocqueville, sees decentralisation of power as the essence of democratic government26. The principle of segmental liberty seeks to ensure that decision-making potency is, as much as possible, delegated to the separate subdivisions of society whereas issues of common interest are decided jointly. In contrast with majority rule, it may be characterised as minority rule over the minority itself in matters that are their exclusive concern27.This follows from Jan-Erik Lanes proposition that all societal groups will respect the rules of democracy if they have autonomy over their own affairs28. Federalism is the best-known method of giving segmental autonomy to different groups in society. Segmental autonomy may also be provided on a non-territorial primer coat which is of particular relevance to plural societies where distinct sub-societies are not g eographically concentrated. Such non-territorial autonomy characterised the Belgian agreement prior to its transformation into a federal official state in 1993. Switzerland is also a federal state in which power is divided between the central government and a number of cantonal governments. Both systems, concord to Tocquevilles analysis, are conducive to democracy.It is evident that one of the subsidiary characteristics of segmental autonomy in the form of federalism is that the smaller persona units are overrepresented in the federal chamber their share of legislative seats exceeds their share of the population29. The maximum extension of this principle seems to be equality of prototype regard slight of the component units population. Such parity is evident in Switzerland where two representatives stand for to each one canton. Can an over authority of minorities be truly democratic if it disregards the will of the majority? Moreover, the form segmental autonomy takes in the Netherlands is that pillar organisations in areas such(prenominal) as education, health care and housing are recognised and financed by the government.Each organisation has coarse influence in the running of their policy sector, but the change magnitude intervention of the state in grand standards means that the organisations that are autonomous in name are, in practice, quasi-governmental agencies30. Thus, it can be argued that the pillars are to an extent no longer democratically representative of the societies they act for. What of democratic stability? In the Swiss context, super decentralised federalism has been accused of being a hindrance of effective government31 and Belgiums new system of federal consociationalism is bipolar, which is not always a good condition for its smooth operation32.There can be no doubt that the adoption of a system of elected administrative officers plays a most vital part in the process of democracy33. The notion of proportionality serves as th e basic standard of political representation34. The rule of proportionality, said to be so central to the politics of accommodation, attempts to ensure that all parties have glide slope to state resources35. Indeed, it seems that if partisan conflict is multi-dimensional, a two-party system must be regarded as an electoral straight jacket that can hardly be considered to be democratically superior to a multi-party system reflecting all of the major issue alternatives36.Moreover, in two-party systems the party gaining an overall majority will list to be overrepresented in parliament, whereas votes translate into seats proportionally through the adoption of proportional representation37. The Swiss consociational system, takes representation a step further through referenda, whereby the public effectively have a shun on state policy38. Thus, with regard to representation, it would seem that consociational democracy acquires the higher democratic ground.On the other hand, even if we relent that proportionality is more representative, it is implicit that a defining characteristic of consociational democracy is the absence of arguing since the campaigning is directed at the mobilization of the sub-cultural constituency, not at competition with other parties. Competition between parties is, however, a defining feature of democracy39, stemming from the notion of freedom and choice. Can non-competition be equated with absence of choice and thus be seen as undemocratic? Conversely, certain academics have argued that in its pure form the system of proportional representation generally backfires and may turn out to be the kiss of death40. Indeed, party volatilities may have significant consequences for the political process in consociational democracies41.The Swiss party system is highly fragmented42, and the increasing fractionalisation of the party system in Belgium has led to high volatility elections and instability43. Does this adhere to the democratic notion of stability? Moreover, in the Swiss context it may be argued that referendums are basically majoritarian in their effects, because they are commonly decided by simple popular majorities. Indeed, it has been suggested that, due to the inability to discuss matters emerging in referenda, they are bound to be more dangerous than representative assemblies to minority rights44. Additionally, statistics show that the level of participation in Swiss referenda has been low often below 50 per cent of those eligible to vote45. In the light of some assertions that too many referenda kill democracy46, can this aspect of proportionality in Swiss politics be described as democratic?The grand coalition system of government serves to give each societal segment a share of power at the central level. There is no provide a guarantee, however, that the policy will not be outvoted by a majority when its primary objectives are contested47. The purpose of a minority veto48 in consociational democracies is to provide such a guarantee. The minority veto tool provides a strong system of checks and balances and reinforces the notion of separation of powers at the heart of government. Indeed, academics have noted that Belgiums federal state is replete with checks and balances49, and the notion of separation of powers in both Belgium and Switzerland manifests itself through a bicameral legislature with equal legislative powers. Consequently, it may be argued that the minority veto sustains the democratic principle of holding the government to account.Does mutual veto work in practice? One of the rules of the consociational zippy was the governments right to govern with the corollary that the parties should not interfere thus allowing the government to rise to a higher place inter-subcultural strife. To a considerable degree, this aloofness from party politics has given way to a politicisation of the locker by the governing parties50, making the minority veto principle largely redundant . However, when it does have an effect, the reciprocal control of power inherent in mutual veto often results in mutual obstruction and blockade decision-making. Swiss positive amendments, for example, must be approved by a majority of the cantons which effectively gives the smallest cantons, with less than 20 per cent of the population, a potential veto51.It is implicit in Switzerland that good solutions are often troublesome to reach because the Federal council does not observe the implicit rules of the accommodation game52. Can a system that disregards the wishes of the majority be truly democratic? Some have even commented that to admit the minority veto as a major and normal means of limiting power is to admit a move involuntarily principle53. If you reward divisiveness through veto power, you institutionalise those divisions. In this light, Lipjpharts machinery seems to engender consensus-braking than consensus-making54. Divisiveness and instability can hardly be reconcil ed with the traditional concept of democracy.Is consociational democracy democratic? Assessing the main themes of Lipjpharts concept has highlighted fundamental weaknesses in consociational theory55. Even though grand coalitions seek to represent all groups in society, the collegial manner of decision-making raises problems of accountability. Segmental autonomy may be praised in theory, but it seems that in practice, smaller pillars tend to become institutionalised through heavy regulation at central level, thus negating the democratic essence of the notion.The concept of proportionality aims at a fair distribution of power, yet the party volatilities produced as a result can hardly be conducive to democratic stability. Academics of the consociational school argue that minority veto resolves the accountability deficit inherent in grand coalition government since it provides a system of checks and balances. On the other hand, critics contest that mutual veto encourages gridlock and f rustration at the heart of administrations. The Swiss and Belgian make has shown that consociational democracies tend to be stable, but are they stable because they are consociational56? At the very least, empirical evidence highlights a democratic deficit in consociational theory57.1 What democracy is and is not, p.702 http//www.xrefer.com/ entree/3437843 http//www.keele.ac.uk/depts/steeple/Staff/Pages/Luther/researchint.htm4 Politics and Society in Western Europe, passage + ersson, p.1565 http//www.xrefer.com/entry/3437296 Consociationalism has been practiced in Belgium and Switzerland since 1945 and 1943 respectively. Note It has been argued that the Swiss model does not strictly fit into the consociational mould (Barry, look backward article), but for the purpose of this analysis we will discuss Switzerland due to its grouping as one of the four original identified consociational societies (Paul Pennings, party elites in divided societies, p.21, also Kenneth D Mc Rae p.520)7 http//www.xrefer.com/entry/3437848 On Liberty, J.S. Mill, Cambridge University Press, 19899 Sited in Politics and Society in W Europe, lane + ersson p.15710 The odd fellow, Switzerland, p.13511 Politics and society in Western Europe, Neo Taqu. p.212 http//www.keele.ac.uk/depts/spire/Staff/Pages/Luther/researchint.htm13 Arend Lipjphart, Consociation and Federation p.50014 W. Arthur Lewis, Politics in West Africa (London George Allen and Unwin, 1965) p.6415 Since 1959, Switzerland has been governed by a grand coalition of the four major political parties. The Belgian state is also maintained according to Luthers framework of vertical linkage within the subcultures as well as engagement in overreaching accommodation to bridge the gap between the pillars (From consociation to federation, Belgium, p.104)16 From consociation to federation, Belgium, p.98. In Belgium, to an increasing extent, the system of consociational accommodation became the system of Christian Democrat and socialist co operation. In 1999, the natural centre left coalition has been in power for twelve years17 Brian Barry, review article, p.48218 The odd fellow, Switz, p.15419 Indeed, it has been said that power and strict accountability for its use are the essential constituents of good government. Woodrow Wilson, Congressional Government A take apart in American Politics (New York Meridian Books, 1956) p.18620 Brian Barry, review article, p.48321 The odd fellow, Switz, p.13822 In a multi-party system without a majority party, the coalitions programme will be a compromise between the individual party platforms a compromise made by political leaders instead of mandated directly by the voters. (Democracies, p.110)23 Comparative constitutional engineering, p.7124 Party Elites in divided societies, paul pennings, p.2225 Democracies p.16926 Politics and Society in Western Europe, Ersson + Lane, p.16927 Lipjphart, consociation and federation, p.50028 Lipjphart, consociation and federation, p.50029 Demo cracies, p.17330 Party elites in divided societies, Rudy Armstrong, p.12431 The Swiss Labyrinth, p.2532 From consoc. To fed. Belgium, p.10733 European democracy between the wars, p.2334 Consociation and federation, Lipjphart, p.50135 Parties, Pillars, Rudy B. Andeweg, p.12936 Democracies, p.11337 Democracies, p.151. The two-party leaders bias was strongly illustrated in the UK in 1997, with Labour gaining 65 per cent of British seats on 45 per cent of the vote, while the Conservatives were under-represented in the commons (Dunleavy, Developments in British Politics p.147)38 Indeed, Switzerland has developed the theory and practice of the referendum to a pitch to which no other nation has begun to match (Butler and Ranney, eds., ReferendumsA Comparative Study of employ and Theory (Washington, D.C. American Enterprise Institute, 1978) p.539 What democracy is and is not p.7040 Comparative constitutional engineering, p.73. It has been said that the dispersal of power across several mi nority parties adds profusion to confusion, Ibid. p.7141 paul pennings, party elites, p.3842 The odd fellow, p.14143 From consociation to federation, Belgium, p.93. In country or Anarchy? Ferdinand A Hermens warned of the dangers proportional representation posed to the survival of democracy, arguing that the instability created by the latter would invoke the rise of autocratic regimes. (F.A. Hermens, Democracy or Anarchy? Astudy of Proportional Representation (New York Johnson Reprint Corporation, 1972) p.293)44 Democracies, p.3145 The Swiss Labyrinth, p.546 The Swiss Labyrinth, p.547 Consociation and Federation, Lipjphart, p.50148 Note The term minority veto will be used interchangeably with mutual veto49 From consociation to federation, Belgium, p.103. The Belgian constitution can only be changed by two-thirds majorities in both chambers of the legislature. This rule is effectively a minority veto where a minority or a combination thereof controls at least a third of the votes i n one chamber.50 Parties, Pillars and the Politics of accommodation, Andweg p.12751 Democracies, p.19052 The Swiss Labyrinth, p.2753 Comparative Constitutional Engineering, p.7154 Comparative constitutional engineering, p.7255 http//www.sagepub.co.uk/journals/details/issue/abstract/ab013998.html56 http//www.xrefer.com/entry/34372957 Craig and De Burca p.155